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Abstract. What is the role of the principle of sufficient reason in 
Baruch  Spinoza’s  ontological  proof  for  God’s  existence?  Is  this  role 
identical  within  Spinoza’s  early  work  on  method,  the  Treatise  on  the 
Emendation  of  the  Intellect,  and  his  magnum  opus,  the  Ethics?  This  paper 
argues  affirmatively  that  the  methodology  employed within  the  Ethics  is 
consonant with that method found within the Treatise, and this claim is 
substantiated through an engagement with the influential works of Don 
Garrett  and  Aaron  Garrett.  It  is  also  demonstrated  through  an  original 
reconstruction of the Treatise itself. In this reconstruction, basic premises 
are  identified  which  can  validly  prove  Spinoza’s  intended  conclusion  of 
substance monism. It is finally determined that what the Treatise and the 
Ethics share, specifically, is a methodology which begins with non-nominal 
definitions that denote the real, sufficient causes of their respective objects. 
However, at certain junctures, this methodology is expressed with greater 
consistency within the Treatise as opposed to within the Ethics. Evidence for 
this  will  be  provided  from  the  primary  texts  themselves  and  from  the 
subsequent analyses of Don Garrett and Aaron Garret as well. 
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Introduction 
  Baruch Spinoza’s argument for substance monism is as important as it is 
controversial. The notion that the whole universe is a singular, unbroken entity, that 
this entity is without beginning, end, or limit, and that it operates solely according to 
its own immanent, inviolable laws – these features of Spinoza’s universe form the 
metaphysical bedrock of his Early Modern brand of rationalism. The regularity of 
these laws is inextricably tied to Spinoza’s conception of the principle of sufficient reason 
(hereafter abbreviated as the “PSR”). It is this rule, which holds that “for every x, if 
x exists, then there is some sufficient cause for x to obtain,” that mandates the 
regularity and intelligibility of the monistic universe. For if all events are sufficiently 
caused, and secondly, if all causes are themselves immanent to Nature, then all 
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occurrences  are,  in  principle,  explainable  and  comprehendible.  All  manner  of 
miracles, mysteries, divine interventions, and premodern obstacles to knowledge are 
wholly precluded. 
  However it is for just this reason that Spinoza’s argument for substance 
monism  has  historically  been  so  very  controversial.  If  successful,  it  precludes 
traditional theism which posits the existence of a personal and transcendent deity. It 
moreover precludes that such a deity, as well as finite human beings themselves, can 
ever  possess  an  undetermined,  free  will  (understood  negatively  as  libero  arbitrio). 
Along with this natural determinism, as well as the preclusion of anything super-
natural  which  could  possibly  transcend  this  determinism,  a  whole  new  view  of 
human existence, morality, and politics is born. Man is no longer considered to be 
an imperium in imperio,1 a unique creation subject to its own laws, apart from the 
fundamental laws of nature. Deprived of a radically unique and free will, traditional 
conceptions of “sin,” “evil,” and “culpability” are rendered senseless. What replaces 
these  is  a  new  vision  of  man,  wholly  natural  and  always  acting  according  to 
deterministic, rational principles. Instances of apparent evil-doing are truly the result 
of naturally-occurring ignorance and not radical evil. The new goal in morality and 
politics becomes not the atonement of sins by the free grace of God (through the 
medium of the institutional Church); instead it is the progressive education of man. 
The  lifting  of  human  beings  out  of  ignorance,  the  restoration  of  man’s  innate, 
rational faculties is the new key to moral rectitude and political stability. Needless to 
say, all of this wholly undermines what were the traditional pillars of European 
society throughout pre-modernity. 
  While  some  criticisms  of  Spinoza’s  monism  have  centered  upon  these 
moral  and  theological  concerns  specifically,  others  have  tried  a  different  track 
altogether – striking at the heart of the rationalist method which serves as monism’s 
intellectual  support.  From  Spinoza’s  contemporaries  up  to  the  present  day,  the 
critics of monism have perennially sought to deny the self-sufficiency of reason. 
This  is  perhaps  best  articulated  by  the  20th  century  political  philosopher,  Leo 
Strauss. In his preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1965) the conservative Strauss 
tries  to  defend  orthodoxy  against  the  monistic  rationalism  of  Spinoza  and 
modernity. In doing so, Strauss does not directly defend the various propositions of 
religious  orthodoxy  themselves.  Instead  he  merely  undermines the  certainty  and 
self-sufficiency of competing reason, lowering its basic principles to the level of 
mere  “hypothetical”  assertions. In  this  way,  the  resulting  rationalist  view  of the 
universe, one which precludes the mysterious God of the Bible, becomes equally as 
hypothetical. 
The  orthodox  premise  cannot  be  refuted  by  experience  nor  by 
recourse  to  the  principle  of  contradiction  .  .  .  The  genuine 
refutation of orthodoxy would require the proof that the world and 
human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a  
 
 
Society and Politics                                                            Vol. 5, No. 2(10)/November 2011 
  139 
mysterious  God;  it  would  require  at  least  the  success  of  the 
philosophic system . . . Spinoza’s Ethics attempts to be the system, 
but it does not succeed; the clear and distinct account of everything 
which it presents remains fundamentally hypothetical.2 
  What  Leo  Strauss  claims  in  this  and  surrounding  passages  is  that  the 
intelligibility of the world is the one thing necessary to establish the supremacy of 
reason over orthodox faith. Yet the total intelligibility of the universe is far from an 
obvious or self-evident premise. If anything, it is a claim which, itself, is dependent 
upon the prior affirmation, and use, of a robust faculty of reason. Yet it is entirely 
unclear that our belief in reason is, in the first place, warranted. At long last, claims 
Strauss, the rationalist narrative must rely upon a free choice of faith in order to 
affirm its fundamental rationalist principles. Hence, in the end, it is no superior to 
religious orthodoxy. To the contrary, at least orthodoxy is explicit and honest about 
its reliance upon faith and non-evident premises. 
 
The Circularity of “Intelligibility” and “Reason”  
  At the very core of Strauss’ critique is the charge that reason’s claim to self-
sufficiency is unproven and that it begs the question. For instance, the universal 
principle of sufficient reason claims that every given thing has a definite cause for its 
particular existence. Otherwise, asserts the rationalist, the entity in question would 
be  wholly  unfathomable  and  absurd,  lacking  all  intelligibility.  It  would  remain 
entirely cut off from the apprehension of human reason. Hence, the principle of 
sufficient reason is itself indisputable. For without it, many absurd and unintelligible 
things may follow. 
  To this, however, Strauss might simply shrug his shoulders. Perhaps it is 
indeed the case that some things in the universe are unfathomable and strike human 
reason as “absurd.” It may be true that the human intellect operates according to the 
lawful principles of cause and effect. It may be true, therefore, that the human mind 
can  only  apprehend  that  which,  in  the  universe,  similarly  operates  according  to 
regular, intelligible, causal laws. Nonetheless why should we assume that absolutely 
everything in reality is in fact intelligible or operates in this manner? Why should we 
assume a neat matching-up of the human faculty of reason and the intelligibility of 
the greater world? To the conservative critics of Spinozist rationalism this appears 
to be merely a brute attempt to fit the world into the Procrustean bed of human 
thought. In short, assert such critics, the universality of sufficient reason may be a 
viable hypothesis, but it is in no way a necessary one. 
  Bolstering  this  suspicion  of  the  PSR  is  the  principle’s  apparent  “dual-
nature.” On the one hand the PSR is clearly metaphysical – claiming a cause for 
everything in reality; on the other hand it is epistemological – describing the manner 
in which our mind only conceives of things by seeking reasons for their existence. 
Along these same lines, the PSR can be understood as wholly descriptive – both of  
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the way the world and our minds work; but it can also be seen as a normative rule – 
asserting how one ought to seek sufficient reasons before assenting to a given idea or 
judgment. Even the most enthusiastic Spinoza analysts point out this “double use of 
the PSR.” For example, in the opening pages of Michael Della Rocca’s recent work, 
Spinoza (2008), he identifies Spinoza’s key concepts of “correctness,” “reason,” and 
“causation” with that of “intelligibility.” Della Rocca goes on to show, ultimately, 
that in Spinoza’s system the PSR serves as the nexus of explanation and causation.3 
Indeed, in the Ethics Spinoza famously employs the phrase causa seu ratio, i.e. “cause 
or reason,” in his seminal proof for substance monism.4  
  Again, however, the trouble arises if each half of the PSR is meant to be the 
support of the other. In other words, is the normative, epistemological principle that 
we must only assent to that which comes with an intelligible, sufficient reason the 
support for affirming a picture of a causally deterministic universe, and vice versa? If 
true, this would certainly be an instance of vicious circularity. It is a troubling charge 
which is only given further plausibility by Spinoza’s strong doctrine of parallelism 
between  things  and  ideas  as  found  in  part  two  of  the  Ethics:  “The  order  and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”5 These 
universal  principles  which  claim  to  say  something  about  the  intelligibility  of  all 
reality, while also affirming the rectitude of human reason, certainly seem to cohere 
well  with  one  another.  Nonetheless,  the  pertinent  question  is  whether  we  must 
accept this set of mutually consistent rules and laws in the first place. If so, then it 
must be on the basis of something more than mere faith, arbitrary choice, or circular 
reasoning. 
  Problematic as it may be, one cannot simply do away with the PSR - it is far 
too central to Spinoza’s system and his overall commitment to a metaphysics of 
deterministic monism. Rather, what is needed is an analysis of precisely how the 
principle  can  be  validly  derived  without  charges  of  circularity  or  begging  the 
question arising. Yet, one can easily mistake Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, as 
lacking such a demonstration altogether. It would seem that in the opening pages of 
the Ethics, the PSR is bluntly affirmed as a normative rule of thought, something 
which is prior to, or hovers above, the actual universe: “For each thing there must 
be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence.”6 
Indeed, this striking statement comes in the body of a demonstration and is not the 
proposition itself. In other words, it is simply stated rather than supported by a 
dedicated proof. Spinoza’s claim, therefore, is that not only does the whole universe 
operate according to intelligible relations of cause and effect, but also our faculty of 
reason is fully competent to determine or “assign” what these are. 
  This is potentially disturbing for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, 
such a blanket statement smacks of arbitrary fiat. It is as though Spinoza affirms this 
universal  law  of  nature  because  it  conforms  to  an  equally  total  view  of  human 
reason. Meanwhile, neither proposition has, apparently, been adequately defended 
or explained. Second, such universal, normative statements do not cohere with the  
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rest  of  Spinoza’s  thought.  Indeed,  a  broader  examination  of  Spinoza’s  writings 
reveals an outright contempt for positing abstract methods or rules prior to our 
having specific, true ideas about the world. This is especially the case if one takes 
into account Spinoza’s statements as found within his early work, the Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect (hereafter abbreviated as the Treatise).  
  To  this  end,  the  remainder  of  this  article  will  focus  upon  Spinoza’s 
derivation  of  the  PSR  and  substance  monism  within  the  Treatise.  For  it  is  my 
contention that Spinoza’s mature argument in the Ethics is actually largely consonant 
with that found in the Treatise, especially in the manner in which it combats skeptical 
objections. Yet, in several instances, the Treatise makes more explicit that which, in 
the Ethics, appears to be assumed or posited. The discovery of this explicit proof as 
found in the Treatise will require something of a creative reconstruction on my part 
as the Treatise itself was never completed during Spinoza’s lifetime. 
  Finally, it will be shown that Spinoza’s ontological proof in the Ethics is, in 
fact, not vulnerable to common charges of “arbitrary fiat,” precisely because it shares 
a very similar methodology with the Treatise, properly reconstructed. Specifically, it 
will be shown that the ontological proof in the Ethics utilizes an implicit premise, 
that of the principle of sufficient reason, in validly defeating skeptical objections to 
substance monism. In comparing the mature Ethics to the earlier Treatise it will be 
indispensible  to  reference  the  work  of  Don  Garrett,  and  specifically  his  highly 
influential article, “Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument.”7 For it is in this watershed 
work that Garrett delineates precisely how this strategy of “implicit premises” is 
actually used within the Ethics to prove monism. I shall also engage with the work of 
Aaron Garrett, and his influential work on the specific methodologies of the Treatise, 
and how these are translated into the geometric proofs of the Ethics. It will be the 
overall purpose of this article to examine precisely how this strategy of Spinoza’s 
mature Ethics both coheres and diverges from the similar one as found in the earlier 
Treatise. 
 
The Primacy of Truth over Method 
  When examining the Treatise the very first thing that the reader will notice 
is, as stated above, Spinoza’s outright disapproval for the stipulation of abstract 
rules  and  methodologies.  Spinoza  argues  that  commencing  with  a  supposedly 
perfect rule or method, prior to having an adequate idea about the world itself, 
inevitably  leads  to  an  infinite  regress.  Such  an  abstract  and  universal  rule, 
ungrounded in any certainly true idea about the universe, will always require some 
other abstract rule as its proof. Ultimately, there will be no end to the search for 
methodological guarantee, and the whole enterprise will lack sufficient foundation. 
As such, all philosophical speculation must commence, not with an abstract and 
universal method, but rather with specific and certainly true ideas. Only from this 
first seed of knowledge can a properly grounded method emerge.  
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.  .  .the  first  thing  we  must  consider  is  that  there  is  no  infinite 
regress here. That is, to find the best Method of seeking the truth, 
there is no need of another Method to seek the Method of seeking 
the truth, or of a third Method to seek the second, and so on, to 
infinity. For in that way we would never arrive at knowledge of the 
truth, or indeed at any knowledge.8 
And also: 
From this it may be inferred that Method is nothing but a reflexive 
knowledge, or an idea of an idea; and because there is no idea of an 
idea, unless there is first an idea, there will be no Method unless 
there is first an idea. So that Method will be good which shows 
how the mind is to be directed according to the standard of a given 
true idea.9 
  In short, methods and rules may indeed materialize within a mature system. 
Nonetheless, these must be grounded first in some certain and concrete idea of 
reality itself. Otherwise we are left with little more than a grand edifice built upon a 
foundation of sand. An implication of this is that no rule, or in other words, no 
general “sign” can indicate what is to be considered a true idea. Rather, for Spinoza, 
truth  must  be  something  which  is  self-evident.  Truth  must  present  itself  as  an 
intrinsic feature of an idea. “And from this, again, it is clear that, for the certainty of 
the truth, no other sign is needed than having a true idea.”10 
  Moreover, it is not only that Spinoza mandates that we ought to possess a 
certainly true idea before attempting to construct a method or develop abstract rules 
of thought. Instead, with strict consistency, Spinoza positively asserts that we do, in 
fact, possess some definite knowledge.11 This assertion that we must possess at least 
one true idea is the very cornerstone of Spinoza’s philosophic thought as found in 
the  Treatise;  though  it  is  a  point  generally  downplayed  amongst  the  geometric 
demonstrations of the Ethics.  
  Importantly, Spinoza’s claim that we indeed possess some knowledge is one 
which is at once a priori and at the same time non-abstract; it is a claim about the 
world itself. Differing from the majority of contemporary philosophers, influenced 
as they are by Kantian epistemology, Spinoza’s first premise is always that we must 
in fact know something about reality, not about the phenomenal appearance of reality, 
and not about the nature of our own apperception, but reality itself. That we must 
possess at least one true idea is a proposition that Spinoza takes to be entirely non-
controversial. Simply put, to claim otherwise is to lapse into absurdity and self-
contradiction. Positing that we have no knowledge whatsoever is, after all, a sort of 
truth claim. In this way, the total or global skeptic occupies a position that is hardly 
tenable. Spinoza’s biting sarcasm in considering such a position is easily seen:  
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But perhaps, afterwards, some Skeptic would still doubt both the 
first truth itself and everything we shall deduce according to the 
standard of the first truth . . . [But in this case] If they affirm or 
doubt  something,  they  do  not  know  that  they  affirm  or  doubt. 
They say they know nothing, and that they do not even know that 
they know nothing. And even this they do not say absolutely. For 
they are afraid to confess that they exist, so long as they know 
nothing. In the end, they must be speechless, lest by chance they 
assume something that might smell of truth . . . If they deny, grant, 
or oppose, they do not know that they deny, grant, or oppose. So 
they must be regarded as automata, completely lacking a mind.12  
  At least for now, Spinoza’s first premise leaves untouched the position of 
the partial or Pyrrhonic skeptic. Namely, nothing is said as to what specifically we 
are to know; only that we must know something and not nothing. Regardless, it is 
this  parsimonious  and  incontrovertible  premise  which  will  ground  the  rest  of 
Spinoza’s metaphysical system, as well as the deduction of his rationalist method. 
 
A True Idea: The PSR in Embryo 
  It makes little difference to assert that we must possess some knowledge of 
reality  apart  from  a  more  specific  determination  of  just  what  knowledge  is. 
Fortunately, in the Treatise, Spinoza provides us with a clear, two-fold account of 
knowledge: 
1) All knowledge is certain. 
  First,  it  pertains  to  knowledge  that  it  is  apodictic,  or  put  otherwise;  a 
necessary  feature  of  any  item  of  knowledge  is that  it  involves  certainty.13  Once 
again, Spinoza presents this as a non-controversial and even analytic claim. What 
divides proper knowledge from mere sensation or opinion is that we are wholly 
assured of what we purport to know. If we know an idea to be true then we must 
also know that we know the content of this idea. 
  In  perhaps  the  most  famous  and  widely  repeated  illustration  from  the 
Treatise, Spinoza considers the knowledge of a certain man, “Peter.” Spinoza goes on 
to explain that, should we in fact have knowledge of this individual, then we most 
certainly must also know that we possess said knowledge: “Everyone can experience 
this, when he sees that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and 
again, knows that he knows that he knows.”14 Meanwhile, this relationship works in 
the other direction as well. If we are aware of possessing knowledge of Peter (in this 
self-reflective way), then we certainly, in the first place, have that knowledge to 
begin with. In Spinoza’s own words: “. . . to know that I know, I must first know.”15 
2) All knowledge defines its object’s reason for being.  
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  The second and perhaps more revealing characteristic of knowledge is the 
specific manner in which it corresponds to its object in reality, that is, its ideatum. 
For Spinoza, a given item of knowledge can only count as a true idea if it properly 
corresponds to its object’s reason for being. Of course, the mere fact that a true idea 
must, in some way, correspond to its object in reality is not considered a matter of 
dispute by Spinoza. Indeed, it is a claim widely distributed throughout his writings, 
from the Treatise through the Ethics. “A true idea must agree with its object.”16 This 
point is then repeated in the second part of the Ethics as well: “For all ideas . . . agree 
entirely with their objects.”17 To be sure, that the idea of a triangle must be of a 
three sided shape, and not a five sided shape, is precisely what makes it the idea of a 
triangle in the first place. The same would go for the idea of a book, a mind, or a 
horse. An idea is considered a true idea just in case it corresponds correctly to its 
ideatum. 
  Clearly, however, the more controversial aspect of this claim is not the mere 
correspondence of a true idea with its object, but that a true idea must correspond, 
specifically, to its object’s reason for being. The basis for such a specific conception of 
truth can be found most explicitly stated in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the Treatise. It is 
in  these  pivotal  sections  where  Spinoza  reveals  his  conception  of  true  ideas  as 
definitions. Since knowledge, to be properly considered knowledge, must correspond 
to  a  thing  in  reality,  then  knowledge  cannot  include  mere  sense-perception, 
hallucinations, imaginations, and the like. Rather, all real knowledge must define a 
real thing. Hence “definition” is the basic building block of all knowledge. For only 
definition involves true correspondence of a thought to its object. As such, the 
concept of truth can only legitimately apply to definitions (as well as those more 
complex propositions which make use of defined things). 
  At first blush, Spinoza’s claim here may appear to involve a non-sequitur. 
After all, there appear to be many instances of knowledge claims which involve 
reality correspondence that, nonetheless, are not themselves definitions. To take a 
somewhat trivial example, we may claim that we know that the chicken in front of 
us is white. We have certainly made a claim which depends upon a correspondence 
to a thing in reality, (the chicken actually being white) yet we have not defined 
anything. I believe Spinoza’s response to this objection, however, would be that 
even this assertion of knowledge is really parasitic upon definitional knowledge if it is 
to have any meaning or import at all. After all, what is it to call something “white” if 
we have no knowledge at all about that which this whiteness is supposed to inhere? 
I suppose those in the empiricist tradition might claim that all we can ever know are 
a given thing’s sensible properties and never its inmost definition. This, however, is 
itself far from a non-controversial position and would, in any case, be rejected by 
Early Modern rationalists such as Spinoza. For Spinoza, all knowledge is dependent 
upon definition, either directly or else mediately in the manner just described. 
  The pertinent question then becomes: What makes for a perfect definition? 
Spinoza’s answer is clear: “To be called perfect, a definition will have to explain the  
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inmost essence of the thing, and to take care not to use certain propria in its place.”18 
In other words, if true ideas correctly correspond to their objects in reality, then it is 
of consequence how accurately and completely such correspondence occurs. The 
only  truly  comprehensive  correspondence  of  definition-to-object  will  involve  a 
defining of what is the object’s essence. Furthermore, this essence is nothing other 
than the object’s very reason for being, or put otherwise, the object’s reason for 
existing as it does. All considerations of propria, Spinoza’s term for the properties or 
characteristics  of  an  object,  are  wholly  superfluous  to  the  creation  of  a  perfect 
definition, and thus of a perfectly true idea. 
  For example, the true definition of a horse, that is, the adequate idea of 
what it is to be a horse, cannot involve merely a description of the horse’s skin, hair, 
its odor, or its fleas. These are nothing more than accidental properties which do 
not truly define the horse and its reason for existing as it does. To define a horse by 
describing its fleas is only to assume the existence of the horse, and then to describe 
some subsequent effects of that existence (i.e. the attraction of parasitic insects). To 
truly define a horse properly, to have a genuinely true idea of a horse, one must 
describe not its propria, but the cause of its existence as a horse. For, as confirmed in 
the Ethics, “The knowledge of an effect [i.e. a given thing in reality] depends on, and 
involves, the knowledge of its cause.”19 
  All  of  this  may  be  difficult  to  grasp  when  speaking  about  something 
corporeal, such as a living animal. To make matters clearer, Spinoza offers a more 
analytic, geometric illustration of the same point. 
 
If a circle, for example, is defined as a figure in which the lines 
drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, no one fails 
to see that such a definition does not at all explain the essence of 
the circle, but only a property of it . . . If the thing is created, the 
definition,  as  we  have  said,  will  have  to  include  the  proximate 
cause. E.g., according to this law, a circle would have to be defined 
as follows: it is the figure that is described by any line of which one 
end is fixed and the other moveable. This definition clearly includes 
the proximate cause.20 
  Once again, the proper definition of a circle cannot involve the equality of 
its radii. These, just like the fleas of a horse, merely presuppose the existence of the 
circle and then describe one consequent property which results from this existence. 
Instead, the proper definition of a circle (inasmuch as true definitions describe the 
essence or the very reason for the being of a thing) involves how the circle is caused 
to exist as it does. In this case, the explanation is by way of the action of an even 
simpler entity, a line, and the movement of one of its end points while the other is 
held stationary. In each case it is the cause which provides the true, definitive, and 
essential idea of a thing.  
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  Thus far, the whole discussion of lines, circles, definitions, and causes may 
seem entirely trivial – especially when what we are ultimately after is an account of 
the whole universe, a proof that all of reality is of a single substance, and finally, that 
this substance is subject to the universal principle of sufficient reason. Nonetheless, 
the basic account of knowledge and true ideas, which was reconstructed above, is 
vital for this end goal. For it was established first that we must, indeed, have some 
knowledge of at least one thing in reality. In the aforementioned reconstruction it 
was delineated precisely what this knowledge must amount to, namely, apodictic 
knowledge of a thing’s essence, or in other words, certain knowledge of how at least 
one thing in reality comes to be what it is and exist as it does. 
  This is wholly significant. It amounts to something like the PSR in embryo. 
We may not yet be able to affirm any universal principle of the PSR. We may not yet 
be able to affirm that every single thing in the universe is subject to cause and effect, 
that all entities require some sufficient cause for their particular existence, and thus 
that all things in the universe are wholly intelligible. There may yet be mysteries in 
the  world,  miracles,  voluntaristic  deities,  absurdities,  and  things  which  are  not 
comprehensible. Nonetheless, what we have thus far secured is the truth that at least 
one thing in the world is known; and since it is known then it must also be knowable. 
This one thing must have an intelligible essence, and thus an intelligible reason or 
cause for its particular existence. This is what is meant by the “PSR in embryo.” 
There is at least one real thing which is subject to this principle of sufficient reason 
even though the rest of the universe may, hypothetically, escape it altogether. 
 
Simplicity as the Intrinsic Guarantor of Truth 
  What is needed next is an analysis of how the truth presents itself within a 
given idea. Recall that Spinoza insists that there can be no method and no rule for 
discovering the truth prior to our having a certainly true idea. It is, rather, this 
certainly true idea which itself must point us towards the general criterion of truth. 
In other words, “. . . for the certainty of the truth, no other sign is needed than 
having a true idea . . .For certainty and an objective essence [i.e. true idea] are the 
same thing.”21 
  This denial of the priority of method means that the proof of an idea’s 
veracity can’t be external to the idea itself. It is, in any case, impossible to step 
outside of our thoughts and ideas in order to see whether or not they correctly 
correspond  to  their  respective  objects  in  reality.  The only  option  remaining  for 
finding warrant for our ideas is to examine them “internally” as it were. “As for 
what constitutes the form of the true, it is certain that a true thought is distinguished 
from  a  false  one  not  only  by  an  extrinsic,  but  chiefly  by  an  intrinsic 
denomination.”22 But what is it about true ideas which intrinsically allow them to 
present themselves as certainly true? The answer given in the Treatise is “simplicity;” it 
pertains to the nature of simple ideas, and only simple or simplified ideas, to present 
themselves as certainly true.  
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  In many ways this is Spinoza’s major inheritance from the philosophy of 
Descartes.  To  understand  something  means  to  comprehend  it  “clearly  and 
distinctly.” Confused ideas cannot rightly be said to be understood. “Certainty,” we 
established above, is an intrinsic feature of a true idea. Yet we cannot claim certainty 
so  long  as  part  of  a  thing’s  essence  is  obscured  from  us  and  escapes  our  full 
comprehension. “For then, so long as the distinct is not distinguished from the 
confused, certainty, i.e., a true idea, is mixed up with what is not distinct.”23 Thus, 
since certainty is the same thing as having a true idea, and certainty requires full 
comprehension of a thing in reality, then to possess a true idea means nothing else 
than to know something in its entirety. If the thing in question is complex, then this 
means  we  must  come  to  know  each  of  its  simple,  constituent  parts.  We  must 
simplify it. “For the more particular an idea is, the more distinct, and therefore the 
clearer it is.”24 In a word, what is required for guaranteed knowledge is thorough 
analysis. 
  To illustrate this point, one may imagine any number of common fictions. 
Centaurs, unicorns, and werewolves may all come to mind. Upon further reflection, 
what allows us to conceive of such fictitious monsters, and then to falsely imagine 
that these actually exist, is that they are all complex ideas. More specifically, they are 
all chimeras - false compositions of disparate and incompatible parts. We may rightly 
have some conception of a human being and also a separate conception of a horse; 
yet  when  these  are  illicitly  combined  the  imagination  can  compose  the  false, 
complex idea of the Centaur. This is only possible because the constituent elements 
“human” and “horse” are, themselves, true ideas which correspond to a real thing. 
It is only that these true ideas are conceived confusedly and without sufficient clarity 
such that they can be illicitly combined in this manner. If these were distinctly and 
clearly conceived, then the mental composition could never come about. 
  Along these same lines, one could hazily imagine the “geometrical chimera” 
of  a  square  circle.  Yet,  again,  this  is  only  possible  because  this  false  notion  is 
complex and parasitic upon two simpler ideas. If one had a thoroughly distinct 
comprehension  of  the  individual  conceptions  of  “circle”  and  “square,”  then  it 
would be entirely impossible to even imagine the absurd “square-circle” complex. 
For the definition of each term clearly precludes the other. In each case, falsehood is 
made possible by the complexity of a given idea. Complexity allows the mind to 
hold onto an indistinct notion without ever clearly comprehending it as a whole; 
promiscuously considering one aspect, then another, yet never fully uncovering its 
falsehood. It is the absence of clear and distinct comprehension of every simple, 
constituent part that allows for falsity and thus precludes certainty. 
 . . .all confusion results from the fact that the mind knows only in 
part a thing that is a whole, or composed of many things, and does 
not distinguish the known from the unknown (and besides, attends  
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at once, without making any distinction, to the many things that are 
contained in each thing). . . 25 
  It is thus clear enough why certainty requires particular knowledge of every 
simple part of a given thing. However, the converse is less clear. Namely, why 
should having a detailed idea of a given thing’s parts positively entail that this is a 
true idea? In other words, why is simplicity not only a necessary but also a sufficient 
guarantor of a given idea’s truth? Could not we possess a perfectly simple idea (or 
perfectly detailed ideas of a complex thing’s simple parts) which is nonetheless false 
and corresponds to nothing in reality at all? 
  Spinoza’s answer is an unambiguous “No.” It is, in fact, not possible to 
have perfectly simple yet false ideas. As such, simplicity is that unique, intrinsic sign 
of a given idea which attests to its own truth. In other words, simplicity is the 
internal, sufficient guarantor of an idea’s correspondence to its ideatum. Yet it may 
rightly be asked: Why is Spinoza justified in making such a claim? His justification is 
actually presented within two short lines near the very middle of the Treatise. They 
read: “. . . if an idea is of some most simple thing, it can only be clear and distinct. 
For that thing will have to become known, not in part, but either as a whole or not 
at all.”26 
  As straightforward as this statement is, it is this essential proposition which 
demonstrates precisely why our simple ideas surely correspond to their objects in 
reality, and thus why simplicity is identical to certainty: 
  Remember that all knowledge is definitional and thus causal. To have an 
adequate idea of a thing, i.e. to know a thing’s definition, is to know its cause - its 
reason for being. To have a perfectly simple idea is, therefore, to know a thing 
which is its own cause for existing or not existing. Now, the supposed object of a 
perfectly simple idea has to be known in and through itself alone; i.e. it must be self-
caused. But this means that a perfectly simple thing which is false is somehow self-
caused not to exist, that is, it must be a self-contradiction. However, it must be a very 
special kind of self-contradiction - one not derived from individually true elements 
(such as a square circle or a Centaur). Again, this is because it is perfectly simple and 
has  no  multiplicity  of  elements  to  begin  with.  The  supposed  object  must  be 
irreducibly  self-contradictory  and  absurd.  But  in  this  extraordinary  case,  there  is 
nothing in it which is at all intelligible. It cannot ever be conceived or represented to 
the mind as an idea in the first place. Yet an idea which, by its very nature, cannot 
present itself to the mind because of its own irreducible absurdity is no idea at all, 
and we certainly have no reason to fear it!27 Consequently, we may freely attempt to 
conceive of any perfectly simple idea with all confidence and certainty that it will, in 
fact, be a true idea and correspond to its object in reality. (This, again, is totally apart 
from whether or not the object also actually exists in a spatio-temporal sense.) 
  To restate this more concisely: All perfectly simple ideas are, supposedly, of 
perfectly simple things in reality. All perfectly simple things in reality must be their  
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own cause for existing or not existing. If a thing is its own cause for not existing, 
then it is an irreducible self-contradiction, and thus a complete absurdity. We could 
never conceive of it, or form an idea of it. For simple things are either known “as a 
whole or not at all.”28 Thus, all truly simple ideas which we do possess must be of 
actually extant things. They must, therefore, be certainly true ideas. 
  When we examine the possible range of all our ideas, both intrinsically (in 
terms of their simplicity) and extrinsically (in terms of their correspondence), we 
quickly  come  to  realize  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  certainty. 
Namely, all complex ideas, i.e. those not broken down into their simple parts, fail to 
be certain – they remain only possibly true. For, as explained above, clarity and 
distinctness require that we know a thing completely, and therefore know it in all of 
its particularity. Simplicity is a necessary feature of certainty.  
  Moreover, as just demonstrated, simplicity is also a sufficient indicator of a 
certainly  true  idea.  This  is  for  the  reason  that  all  truly  simple  ideas  will  either 
correspond to their respective objects in reality, or they will not present themselves 
to  the  mind  in  the  first  place.  Hence,  once  we  do  possess  a  simple  idea,  we 
immediately become certain of its veracity. Put in other words, simplicity is the way 
a certainly true idea presents itself as such. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Since,  as  per  Section  III,  it  is  a  feature  of  true  ideas  that  they  involve 
certainty and, as per Section II, we in-fact do possess at least one true idea; then it 
follows that we must at least possess the true idea of a perfectly simple thing in 
reality. 
 
The PSR, Monism are Born 
  In the last two sections we have shown that a given true idea is like the PSR 
in embryo; it involves the certain knowledge of its object’s sufficient reason for 
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being. Second, this idea presents its own, intrinsic method for presenting itself as 
true. Now it will be demonstrated that this self-asserting, true idea is that which 
ultimately  blossoms  into  a  universal  conception  of  monistic  substance  and  a 
universal principle of sufficient reason. The certainly true idea, this PSR in embryo, 
finally matures into a fully comprehensive metaphysics. 
  The main conclusion thus far is that we must possess the true idea of a 
simple, and thus self-caused, thing in reality. Again, this fact is not derived from any 
abstract  rule  or  principle,  but  only  from  the  necessary  admission  that  we  must 
possess some knowledge of reality, along with a clear idea of what knowledge (i.e. a 
true idea) must actually amount to. Up to this point, the Straussian, the theist, the 
existentialist,  and  the  Pyrrhonic  skeptic  may  each  still  assert  that  outside  of  this 
certainly true idea and its intelligible, simple object, a whole host of non-rational, 
non-determined, and non-intelligible entities may exist. 
  Yet  it  is  precisely  the  simplicity  of  our  necessarily  true  idea  which  will 
ultimately preclude all of these absurdities. For, as we have said, it pertains to the 
objects of simple ideas to be self-caused. (Since all knowledge presents the causes of 
its  respective  object,  if  an  object  were  not  self-caused,  then  it  could  not  be 
conceived in and through itself, i.e. simply.) Since this real object is self-caused, then 
it must be unconditioned and unlimited by anything other than itself to exist as it 
does. What’s more, since the perfectly simple thing cannot be an irreducible self-
contradiction (for then we would never have an idea of it in the first place), it 
certainly cannot limit itself from existing in any way. In short, this entity of which we 
have  a  perfectly  simple  and  distinct  idea  must  be  both  real  and  infinite. 
Furthermore, it must be infinite not only after its own kind, but absolutely infinite. 
  In short, what Spinoza defines in the Ethics as substance, “… what is in 
itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the 
concept of another thing . . .”29 must ultimately be the very same entity that he 
defines as God, “. . .a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an 
infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”30 
What mandates such an identity (between a substance which contains the idea of its 
own cause and infinite God) is nothing other than the causal nature of knowledge 
itself. 
  The  obvious  implication  of  this  is  that  the  one  certainly  true  idea  we 
possess must be of an infinite and intelligible object in reality. In this way, intelligibility 
does indeed mark the entirety of existence; for nothing exists outside of this simple, 
infinite substance. The whole universe is thus knowable, and not only this, but 
actually, implicitly known by all rational creatures. It is the very first thing we know. 
However, none of this is bluntly asserted by some abstract rule or transcendental 
assumption. Rather, intelligibility is a concrete feature of a specific entity of which 
we have a certainly true idea. Since we know this entity to be infinite, intelligibility 
itself expands, as well, to infinity. The common charges of circularity and begging the 
question so often levied against Spinoza thus fail.   
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  Of course, it must be reiterated that this all hinges upon Spinoza’s very 
strong conception of infinity as “absolute infinity” or “absolute totality.” Ordinarily, 
people can imagine many “infinite” things all coexisting upon their own plains, (e.g., 
infinitely long sets of odd numbers alongside infinitely long sets of even numbers). 
However, Spinoza makes it clear that such common examples are not truly infinite 
in the fullest sense, but rather, involve a partial negation. They are merely infinite in 
a qualified manner – infinite “after their own kind.”31 As such, the sort of infinity 
which applies to God can only be unqualified, absolute infinity, and it is for this 
reason, that the intelligibility of substance is something which fills all of existence. 
  The fundamental point here is that reason is something which inheres in an 
intelligible  substance.  It  does  not  pre-exist  it  or  determine  it  from  the  outside. 
Rather reason, causation, and intelligibility are part of the very fabric of a knowable 
substance. The intelligibility of such a substance mandates that it has, for itself, an 
intelligible and sufficient cause for its own existence. It therefore conditions, not 
only its own infinite existence, but also the finite existence of all other things which 
constitute its various modifications. For the infinitude of a self-causing substance 
mandates that, first, all things are in this one substance, and second, that all things 
are subject to this singular causation. In this way, firmly grounded in the knowledge 
of an actual, concrete thing in reality, we can finally reach the sound conclusion of 
deterministic  monism,  and  positively  preclude  all  things  supernatural,  absurd, 
uncaused, and irrational. For all things not only have as their sufficient cause infinite 
substance, but moreover, this cause is itself rational and intelligible. Its effects, or in other 
words its modifications, will likewise be determined to be what they are in a wholly 
rational and intelligible manner. 
 
Comparison with the Ethics 
  The major contention of this article was that Spinoza’s early work in the 
Treatise reveals the basis for the methodology also employed within the latter Ethics. 
Now that the proof from the Treatise has been reconstructed, all that is left is to 
compare  this  with  the  similarly  “causal”  proof  as  found  in  the  Ethics.32  This  is 
specifically to be found in the first, alternate demonstration of that proposition. 
  Here  one  will  find,  as  in  the  Treatise,  two  basic  elements.  First, 
substance/God must be the cause of its own existence or nonexistence: 
 
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much 
for its existence as for its nonexistence . . . But a substance which 
was of another nature would have nothing in common with God . . 
. and therefore could neither give him existence nor take it away. 
Since, then, there can be, outside the divine nature, no reason, or, 
cause  which  takes  away  the  divine  existence,  the  reason  will 
necessarily have to be in his nature itself.  
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  Second, it is inconceivable that infinite substance (i.e. God) can cause its 
own nonexistence. In this way, we know that it is impossible for God not to exist: 
That is, his nature would [have to] involve a contradiction. But it is 
absurd to affirm this of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely 
perfect. Therefore, there is no cause, or reason, either in God or 
outside God, which takes his existence away. And therefore, God 
necessarily exists, q.e.d. 
  Right away the consonance between the causal argument in the Treatise and 
the abovementioned proof from the Ethics reveal themselves. In both arguments, 
“knowledge as causation” is affirmed. To know an effect is nothing other than to 
have an adequate idea of its cause. Indeed, this is originally stated as early as E1a4, 
“The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.” 
Also in both arguments, substance is something which cannot be self-contradictory; 
consequently the one, infinite substance must exist. 
  Indeed, all of this suggests another, “second order” similarity between the 
Treatise and the Ethics. That is the fact that both arguments, indeed, are truly a priori. 
In the history of Spinoza scholarship it has occasionally been posited that the Ethics 
actually includes a hidden existential premise – the existence of at least one, modal 
thing – and that only this suppressed premise yields the desired conclusion of an 
infinite God’s actual existence. Perhaps the most influential proponent of such a 
reading  is  H.H.  Joachim,  and  it  is  specifically  his  position  which  Don  Garrett 
critiques: 
 
Joachim claims that all four proofs are variations on a single theme: 
‘once grant that anything is actual and you must admit that God 
necessarily is actual.’ He further claims that Spinoza’s argument, 
alone  among  formulations  of  the  ontological  argument,  escapes 
Kant’s criticisms and is in fact valid.33 
It is in fact very odd that Joachim persists in calling the arguments 
“ontological” while attributing to them a missing premise to the 
effect that something or other exists . . . It is not at all surprising, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  an  essentially  cosmological  argument 
should  be  found  to  escape  Kant’s  criticism  of  ontological 
arguments.34 
  It appears that while Joachim perceived a “hidden” existential premise in 
the  Ethics,  he  admired  the  Treatise  for  being  more  upfront  about  its  existential 
commitments,  and  thus  for  providing  the  real  basis  for  the  Ethics’  geometrical 
proofs, and especially the definitions upon which those proofs are built. In an incisive 
passage Aaron Garrett writes of this position:  
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Joachim conjectured … that the TIE was the ultimate source of 
these first principles rather than the Ethics . . . As a consequence of 
this  interpretation,  Joachim  –  quite  reasonably  –  saw  the 
geometrical method as having two fundamental flaws. First, the 
geometrical  form  was  ultimately  inadequate  to  the  content  that 
Spinoza wished to explicate, since geometric presentation stays at 
an abstract level and never really attains a concrete form . . . The 
second, and closely related criticism was that the geometrical form 
presents itself as a synthetic deduction whereas it includes all sorts 
of analytic components.35 
  Both Don Garrett and Aaron Garrett reject Joachim’s conjecture in two 
ways.  First,  it  is  denied,  I  think  rightly,  that  the  Ethics  needs  some  or  another 
existential premise for its axioms and subsequent proofs to have any real import, 
that is, to have any traction with reality. Second, both rightly reject Joachim’s claim 
that the Treatise is any more explicit about positing an existential premise than is the 
Ethics. Indeed, as I hope I have shown above, the Treatise does nothing of the sort. It 
is  never  claimed  that  we,  first,  have  knowledge  of  some  modal  thing  actually 
existing. It is rather claimed that we, simply, must have some knowledge. Spinoza, in 
the  Treatise,  employs  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  form  of  argument  against  global 
skepticism, revealing it to be inherently self-defeating. Yet the argument is wholly 
conceptual and a priori, and does not assert that we know any actual thing, let alone 
any actual, modal thing. The knowledge which we must necessarily possess may, 
very well, be of a real thing which is not actually extant (again, such as the true 
knowledge of a perfect circle). 
  Importantly,  however,  the  contemporary  positions  of  Don  Garrett  and 
Aaron Garrett also reject the opposite wing of Spinoza interpretation. This is the 
tendency which interprets Spinoza’s ontological proofs as purely formal and analytic. 
Well represented by Harry Wolfson and William Earle, such theorists tend to deny 
that the Ethics does anything more than to analyze those ideas and intuitions which 
already present themselves to us. Again, Don Garret writes: 
 
On the Wolfson-Earle view, Spinoza is essentially reporting, rather 
than arguing, that we have or can have an experience of God’s 
nature in which we rationally perceive His existence as necessitated 
by  His  essence  .  .  .  Wolfson  argues,  and  Earle  implies,  that 
ontological arguments, properly understood, never do more than 
report, analyze, and elucidate such a rational perception.36 
  As a consequence of this position, proponents of the Wolfson-Earle view 
are  perhaps  more  likely  to  perceive  a  great  difference  between  the  “properly 
ontological” proofs of the Ethics, and the more synthetic, causally based arguments  
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of the Treatise. For the Ethics, they assert, does nothing more than elucidate nominal 
definitions, rather than attempting to first ground those definitions in actual things, 
ideas, and causes in the world. 
  Once again, though, the contemporary positions of both Don Garrett and 
Aaron Garrett reject such a reading of Spinoza’s ontological argument as found in 
the Ethics. Rather, it is affirmed that Spinoza’s ontological arguments in this mature 
work are not purely analytic and definitional (though they are a priori); rather they 
involve a robust notion of the principle of sufficient reason – a strong idea of 
causality  which  is  not merely  part  of  a nominal  definition, but  actually has real 
efficacy in the world. As Don Garrett explains: 
 
Spinoza is best understood as offering four interrelated arguments 
which resemble ontological arguments in being essentially a priori 
and  relying  on  a  definition  of  ‘God,’  but  which  resemble 
cosmological arguments in depending on a version of the principle 
of sufficient reason.37 
  Along very similar lines, Aaron Garrett expounds on what he sees as the 
telling difference between Spinoza’s use of axioms and his use of definitions within 
the Ethics. He asserts that axioms do, indeed, represent analytic, definitional claims – 
most often referring to given relations between defined terms. However, crucially, 
those fundamental definitions themselves are not merely nominal or conventional. 
Indeed, definitions are real and substantive precisely because, as clearly outlined in 
the Treatise, they involve the real and sufficient causes for their respective objects. 
Thus Aaron Garrett writes on the distinction between axioms and definitions: 
Why definitions and not axioms? In the TIE Spinoza emphasized 
that universal axioms (TIE 93) are incapable of determining us to 
the contemplation of one singular essence or another. Rather we 
need  to  discover  definitions  of  singular  things  upon  which  the 
axioms can operate in order to form thoughts from some particular 
affirmative essence or from a true and legitimate definition. Only 
then will we be able to discuss particular things and their causes, 
and refer them back to the first cause. This does not mean that 
axioms are unimportant in comparison with definitions, they are 
extremely important, but ultimately they depend on definitions for 
any sort of ‘traction’ they have on actual things.38 
  Once more, we see the contemporary interpretation of Aaron Garrett and 
Don Garrett revealing the basic consonance of the Ethics’ methodology with the 
methodology of the Treatise. In both works, definitions are not merely nominal, but 
are determined by their place in the real, causal chain of sufficient reasons.  
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Conclusion 
  As perceptive as these above arguments indeed are, there is still a basic 
difficulty in completely reconciling the Treatise with the methodology of the Ethics. 
This becomes evident in Don Garrett’s own reading of the principle of sufficient 
reason as found within the Ethics. Specifically, this comes in the third axiom of part 
one which reads: “From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; 
and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to 
follow.” Curiously, Don Garrett argues for a “liberal” or expansive reading of this 
axiom: 
 
If  we  read  Spinoza’s  term  ‘effect’  liberally,  as  ‘state  of  affairs,’ 
Axiom III then claims that the full reason or explanation of a state 
of affairs must constitute a sufficient condition for it, and that no 
state  of  affairs  can  lack  such  a  reason;  in  other  words,  that  a 
sufficient reason can be given why everything should be as it is. 
This claim can fairly be called a principle of sufficient reason.39 
  Don  Garrett  thus  reads  axiom  three  as  claiming  that  all  things  have  a 
sufficient cause for their particular existence. Of course, a literal or narrow reading 
of the axiom would say nothing more than, “For every cause there is an effect, and 
vice versa.” In other words, it would be a simple, analytic claim about what it means 
to be called a “cause” and what it means to be called an “effect.” Now is it unclear 
why Don Garrett insists upon such an expansive reading of E1a3, except for the 
stated  reason  that  only  such  an  expansive  reading  is  sufficient  for  the  ultimate 
conclusions of part 1 of the Ethics40 (i.e., God’s actual existence). Yet such a reading 
appears to run counter to everything that has been said thus far. As an axiom, this 
statement  should  not  be  adding  anything  synthetic  to  our  body  of  accepted 
knowledge.  It  must  rather  only  elucidate  the  necessary  relations  between  already 
defined terms. (And it is these definitions, and only these definitions, which must 
introduce all real, non-analytic, or non-nominal pieces of knowledge.)  
  In  fact,  Don  Garrett’s  apparent  lapse  in  consistency  at  this  particular 
juncture is very telling. It is exactly on this point, the affirmation of the PSR as such, 
which Spinoza’s critics most often focus upon. To affirm the PSR axiomatically may 
indeed,  as  Garret  states,  be  productive  or  even  indispensible  for  the  ultimate 
conclusion of an infinite God. The real universality of the PSR may even, to some 
individuals, be intuitively appealing. Nonetheless, if it is meant to be introduced at 
the level of an axiom (as opposed to a certainly true definition), then the critics of 
Spinoza are free to reject its reality, and consequently, to consistently reject the 
overall proof for substance monism. 
  Even Don Garrett himself accepts the validity, but rejects the soundness, of 
Spinoza’s causal proof for God’s existence! It is significant that the stated reason for  
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doing so is that he rejects Spinoza’s very strong conception of the PSR. But then, 
this is the whole point – Don Garrett is perfectly free to do so. He is free to reject 
the strong conception of the PSR precisely because it is not, in fact, derived from 
real, secured definitions, but instead comes from an expansive reading of a given 
axiom. 
 
If we accept Spinoza’s principle of sufficient reason . . . we must 
accept  the  existence  of  a  logically  necessary  being  and  the 
soundness of an ontological argument in some form. The same 
conclusion follows if we accept his principle of sufficient reason, 
the  requirement  that  actual  beings  have  actual  causes,  and  the 
empirical existence of something or other. Spinoza and Kant would 
agree on these points, and so would I. I do not, however, believe in 
nearly  such  strong  versions  of  Spinoza’s  principles,  [i.e.  of 
sufficient  reason] partly  because  of these  consequences.  Thus, I 
think Spinoza’s main line or argument is valid but not sound.41 
  Donn Garrett says it best in the first line of this excerpt: “If we accept 
Spinoza’s  principle  of  sufficient  reason  .  .  .  we  must  accept  the  existence  of  a 
logically necessary being.” Two features of this claim must immediately be pointed 
out. First, Garrett asserts that the real, universal efficacy of sufficient reason (that all 
things have a definite cause) is the premise from which God’s existence is eventually 
deduced. Second, this is a hypothetical statement. Only if we accept this premise (i.e., 
the reality of Spinoza’s robust PSR) then must we deduce God’s logically necessary 
existence. 
  These  two  features  reveal  a  basic  dissimilarity  between  the  ontological 
proofs of the Ethics and those found within the Treatise. As demonstrated above, the 
real universal efficacy of the PSR is never asserted axiomatically within the Treatise. 
It is, rather, derived from certainly true ideas (and definitions) about knowledge 
itself: (1) We must possess at least one item of knowledge. (2) All knowledge has 
some real thing as its ideatum. (3) Finally, the knowledge of a given thing involves 
knowledge of its essence, that is, how a given thing comes to be what it is. This definitional 
elucidation of what “knowledge” is (what can aptly be called Spinoza’s rationalist 
essentialism), is what initially inserts sufficient reason into the realm of reality. (For 
we must have at least one true idea about at least one real object of knowledge.) 
Only subsequently can it be determined that a simple thing of which we must have 
true knowledge must be its own, unconditioned cause, and thus have the property 
of absolute infinitude. In short, the universality of the PSR does not precede infinite 
substance  as  an  axiomatic  rule.  Rather,  in  the  Treatise,  the  PSR  is  a  feature  of  a 
necessarily known and defined thing, and it only becomes universal as this known, 
real thing intrinsically reveals itself to be infinite.  
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  Yet because Don Garrett feels he must read the Ethics’ E1a3 expansively, 
such a sure proof of the PSR’s real efficacy is precluded. On Garrett’s reading, the 
PSR as universally efficacious is merely asserted by Spinoza in the first several pages 
of the Ethics. It is not derived, step by step, from certainly true definitions of real 
objects. In fact though, I am largely sympathetic to Don Garrett’s exegesis of axiom 
three. The overall argument of the Ethics does appear to require such a liberal and 
expansive reading. Though, as stated, such axiomatic assertions are always liable to 
charges of being only “hypothetically true” by skeptical critics such as Leo Strauss. 
  What is of lasting interest is that the Ethics does seem to contain within 
itself the resources for deducing a universal principle of sufficient reason without 
resorting  to  such  axiomatic  declarations.  Indeed,  these  resources  are  strikingly 
similar  to  those  found  within  the  Treatise.  We  can  specifically  look  at  the 
aforementioned E1a4 which again states, “The knowledge of an effect depends on, 
and  involves,  the  knowledge  of  its  cause.”  As  the  Treatise  shows,  this  causal 
conception  of  knowledge  can  yield,  through some  intermediate  steps,  a  universal 
conception of sufficient reason. However, for this to work, two emendations must 
be  made  to  the  argumentative  structure  of  the  Ethics  itself.  First,  and  most 
obviously, axiom four which asserts the causal nature of knowledge must come 
prior to the claim of the universality of the PSR in the world. For the former is 
really the proper evidence of the latter. Yet in the Ethics, both are found “side by 
side” in the same set of axioms. Second, the causal nature of knowledge (E1a4) 
must itself be grounded in some certainly true definition. 
  This, at last, is the persisting virtue of the Treatise. For it is in the Treatise 
where the claim of “knowledge as causal” is deduced from the necessary definition 
of knowledge itself. That is, to truly know a thing is not to know its propria, but 
rather to know its essence, its definition, or in other words, how it comes to be what 
it  is.42  Such  a  definitional  analysis  may  be  wholly  consonant  with  the  both  the 
methodology  and  the  ultimate  conclusions  of  the  Ethics.  However,  the  actual 
procedure is best performed in the Treatise itself. Even readings rightly sympathetic 
to the overall similarity between these two works tend to reveal this fact. 
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